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Abstract
The Taliban established their own judicial system in Afghanistan as both an instru-
ment of population control and as a means to project themselves as an effective paral-
lel government. Despite the heavy reliance on coercion, the Taliban’s method of 
dealing with common criminality and resolving disputes was often welcome, though 
the weak appeal system and the rapidity of the trials was sometimes criticized. A more 
structured approach to coercion, featuring rules, regulation and supervision over the 
military, allows less use of violence and promises increased predictability for the popu-
lation, making active resistance less of a necessity. In the long run, the establishment 
of credible judiciary institutions reshapes the social environment and creates vested 
interests in favor of Taliban domination.
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The greatest effort of the Taliban movement in the field of governance since  
its re-emergence in 2002–2003 has gone into the establishment of a shadow 
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1 Complaints about corruption in the Taliban courts started circulating in 2000–2001 and were 
heard by un officials (according to Thomas Ruttig, Afghanistan Analyst Network senior ana-
lyst, contacted November 2013).
judiciary. As the judiciary had been a major preoccupation for the Taliban 
already during the Emirate, it was an obvious place to begin rebuilding their 
political and religious legitimacy after 2001. Establishing a system of courts is a 
means for the Taliban to project themselves as an effective parallel (or even the 
legitimate) government. Inevitably, a judicial system operating in the middle 
of an insurgency will never meet high standards in terms of the rule of law, 
respect for procedures, and equal treatment for all. In this regard the Taliban 
even fell short of their own 1990s standards.1 The question being tested in this 
article is what the case of the Taliban judiciary tells us about the Taliban as a 
coercive organization that claims to be the “legitimate authority” in Afghanistan: 
are they merely coercing people into obedience or are they trying to legitimize 
their domination politically? This article analyzes the Taliban’s strategy to 
develop into a political movement around a law-and-order agenda. It shows 
that a strategy of legitimization can be based primarily on coercion, particu-
larly when coercion is used selectively in a context of war and insecurity.
The information used in the article was largely gathered in 2011–2012 through 
structured and semi-structured interviews with Taliban judges, Taliban com-
manders, Taliban court users, and elders both sympathetic and hostile to the 
Taliban, as well as through conversations with informed individuals in the vari-
ous districts, including some government officials. In total, the team of Afghan 
interviewers, led by the authors and independent researcher Claudio Franco 
carried out face-to-face interviews with 32 Taliban judges, 34 Taliban com-
manders and officials (mostly team and group leaders, but also one military 
commissioner, two governors, and two high-level cadres based in Pakistan), 55 
elders, 22 Taliban court users, and four government court users. To map the 
presence of Taliban courts and to follow up on the findings of the face-to-face 
interviews, an additional four face-to-face and 34 telephone interviews were 
carried out with Taliban commanders and local elders.
The information gathered was used to determine the functioning of the 
Taliban courts, as well as to draw a rough map of the areas covered by Taliban 
courts, district-by-district. Most interviews were carried out by local Afghans 
(typically journalists and stringers) who were able to gain access to the local 
Taliban, the local authorities, and the local elders. The Afghan interviewers 
were organized in two separate groups, which did not know or communicate 
with each other, so as to minimize the risk of “manufactured” interviews. 
Furthermore, one of the authors carried out face-to-face interviews with court 
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2 Mullah Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban (London: Hurst, 2010), pp. 75–78; Alex Strick van 
Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban / Al-Qaeda Merger 
in Afghanistan, 1970–2010 (London: Hurst, 2012), pp. 113–24.
3 Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, p. 22; Carl Forsberg, “The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” 
Washington, dc, Institute for the Study of War, Afghanistan Paper No. 3, 2010, p. 15.
users, elders, and Taliban in Kunar, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Logar, Ghazni, and 
Kabul. These areas were chosen in order to have a sample that was regionally 
balanced and where the interviewers could have access. To draw Map 1 Taliban 
and elders were contacted in every other province of Afghanistan. The results 
of the interviews were integrated with public domain sources.
The 52 elders were interviewed primarily to counterbalance the information 
provided by the Taliban, which inevitably tends to portray their own courts in 
very positive terms. The elders were all picked from areas of Taliban activity to 
ensure that they had some direct or indirect experience with the Taliban 
courts. Some of the elders lived in areas that could be described as being under 
Taliban control, while others lived in contested areas. Most elders expressed 
hostile views regarding the Taliban, a fact that encourages the authors to think 
that their views of Taliban courts were not affected by a positive bias. The 
elders, however, had little information about the inner workings of the Taliban 
judicial system; all they could discuss was the functioning of the courts.
The Origins of the Taliban Judicial System in the 1980s and 1990s
When the Taliban appeared as an organized movement in 1994, justice was 
already at the core of their stated political aims. The emergence of the Taliban 
and their growth derived largely from their firm stance against the corruption 
and local rivalries that were fragmenting the country during the factional war 
that followed the end of the Najibullah regime in 1992. The Taliban appeared in 
the province of Kandahar as a parochial movement, composed mostly of mul-
lahs, religious students, and some ulema (senior clerics), confronting local 
warlords.2 During the jihad against the Soviets, clerics linked to the various 
mujahedin tanzim (factions) already operated courts all over Afghanistan. This 
included the so-called Taliban fronts (madrasa-recruited combat groups) that, 
at the time, were linked to different tanzims and colluded with the Taliban 
movement from 1994 onward. In Kandahar, the main tribunal was located in 
Mahalajat and run by Mawlawi Nazar Mohammed and, after his death in early 
years of the anti-Soviet war, by Mawlawi Mohammad Pasanai, who would 
become a leading religious figure in the Taliban movement.3 Yet, clerics 
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5 Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military Force,” in William Maley (ed.), 
Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban (New York: New York University Press, 
1998), pp. 43-71; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia 
(New York: I.B. Tauris, 2002).
6 Amin Tarzi and Robert D. Crews, “Introduction,” in Amin Tarzi and Robert D. Crews, The 
Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 45.
7 Interview with Taliban judge in Badghis, autumn 2011.
8 Interview with Mawlawi Qalamuddin, summer 2011. Mawlawi Qalamuddin was the minister 
for the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice during the Taliban Emirate 
(1996–2001).
remained often dependent on mujahedin commanders and, in Kandahar, the 
strong commanders, such as Mullah Naqib in Arghandab, Mullah Abdul Samad 
Akhund in Panjwayi, or Mullah Akhtar Jan in Spin Boldak, operated their own 
courts.4 The Taliban from 1994 onward followed an essentially similar model, 
but gradually extended it nation-wide.
In the early years, the Taliban ascent was facilitated by a number of factors, 
especially Pakistani support and the popular fatigue toward violence, corrup-
tion, and disorder. This allowed the Taliban to grow very rapidly while increas-
ing cohesion. In addition, the movement could present itself as an organization 
with law and order at the core of its ideology.5 The judiciary was described as 
“the most revolutionary Taliban practice,” as it differed from the model used by 
other Afghan groups at that time.6 The Taliban themselves can be heard claim-
ing that judges were the strongest institutions of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001.7
As a movement of mullahs, the Taliban perceived themselves as engaged in 
leading society back to the right path after years of civil war and disunity 
among the mujahedin. Through the implementation of Shari’a, the Taliban 
aimed at bringing disorder to an end. The committee for the Promotion of 
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, already created under Burhanuddin 
Rabbani’s presidency (1992–1996 in Kabul, later in Taloqan and Faizabad), was 
transformed into a ministry, with its own special police, the mohtasebor amr 
bi-l-ma’ruf. Its role was to exert social control by disciplining the population’s 
behavior in relation to religious observance, including clothing and shaving.8
Law enforcement, corrections (jail management), and dispute resolution 
remained the prerogative of the Ministry of Justice, headed by Mullah 
Nuruddin Turabi. The Taliban decided to re-establish a centralized court sys-
tem all over the country. Decree 105 of September 10, 1999, instituted three 
levels of courts: lower courts, courts of appeal, and a higher court. The cleri-
cal  nature of the Taliban facilitated the creation of bureaucratic rule, both 
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10 Interview with Mawlawi Osman Tariq, summer 2012.
11 Thomas Ruttig, who was with the un at that time, recalls constant complaints about cor-
ruption in Taliban courts (contacted November 2013).
12 With the exception of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of 
Vice, whose authority was limited to acts in relation with religious observance and public 
morality.
13 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending (London: Hurst, 2005), pp. 283–84.
14 See also Asia Foundation, “An Assessment of Sub-national Governance in Afghanistan,” 
April 2007; Douglas Saltmarshe and Abhilash Medhi, “Local Governance in Afghanistan 
A View from the Ground,” Kabul: areu, June 2011; Jennifer Brick, “The Political Economy 
of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan,” Annual Meeting of the Central 
Eurasian Studies Society, Washington, dc, September 2008.
hierarchical and systematic.9 While there were judges wherever the Taliban 
were in control, how functional this centralized system effectively was remains 
unclear; the Taliban did not have much time to consolidate their regime, as 
they were still fighting to conquer the whole country when they were over-
thrown in 2001. The justice system was kept largely independent from the rest 
of the regime, being directly under Mullah Omar’s authority. Provincial and 
district governors had no authority over the judges. In an attempt to ensure 
honesty, the judges received high salaries, around 5.4 million Afghanis ($1,150 
in year 2000), 20 times the pay of the highest civil servants of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs,10 although this does not mean that corruption did not exist.11 
No punishment was authorized outside of the judicial system and private 
revenge was strictly forbidden.12 In practice, however, the new system had not 
yet been fully implemented by 2001, and, in particular, the secret police (as 
opposed to amr bi-l-ma’ruf) remained above the law, indicating that institu-
tionalization was still in progress.13
The Spread of Taliban Courts
With community structures having lost functionality over the 30 years of inter-
nal conflict, much of the Afghan countryside had been left in a state where 
institutions, including judicial ones, were widely absent. After 2001, the state 
was not able to fully recover the ability to manage the rural areas that it had 
before the war started, in the late 1970s.14
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15 Taliban interviewees across the sample stated that the deployment of the judges was one 
of the first measures to be taken once the Taliban were in control of an area. The first few 
districts started falling under Taliban control in 2003 in remote parts of Zabul, Kandahar 
and Uruzgan.
16 These estimates, without any pretention of representing the actual views of the villagers, 
simply illustrate the Taliban’s self-perception of the extent to which villagers rely on their 
judiciary and the fact that such a perception has been spreading to village elders as well, 
many of whom were not sympathetic to the Taliban. Since the Taliban punished ruth-
lessly anybody caught using the government courts, it is likely indeed that in areas under 
Taliban control few people would use those courts, which in many cases were not even 
functional at the district level. This could explain why the elders’ estimates did not differ 
much from the Taliban’s own. For the same reason, reliance on Taliban courts it is not, by 
itself, evidence of their popularity.
When the Taliban started re-mobilizing in 2002–2003, setting up a court sys-
tem was again a priority. Wherever their armed groups had at least some con-
trol over the villages, the Taliban began providing judicial services.15 Table  1 
shows estimates of population reliance on the Taliban judiciary in a number of 
districts, as provided by elders and Taliban that were interviewed. 16
Table 1 Estimated Comparative Popular Reliance on Taliban and Government Courts in 2011 
(Averages of percentages provided, the first number indicates reliance on Taliban 
courts and the second on government courts).
Interviewees
Districts Elders Taliban
Sayd Abad (Wardak) 80–20 90–10
Panjwai (Kandahar) 70–30
Zhari (Kandahar) 90–10 100–0
Arghandab (Kandahar) 35–65 40–60
Qarabagh (Ghazni) 70–30 60–40
Qarghayi (Laghman) 70–30
Alisheng (Laghman) 70–30
Ghormach (Badghis) 80–20
Kandahar (Kandahar) 50–50
Alingar (Laghman) 80–20
Note: It was not possible to obtain rough estimates in certain locations.
206 Giustozzi and Baczko
central asian affairs 1 (2014) 199-224
<UN>
17 On the presence of Taliban courts near the provincial capital of Paktika, see Tom A. Peter, 
“Leery of Courts, Afghans Seek Taliban Justice,” usa Today, March 7, 2012; for Herat, 
Helmand, Kandahar, and Paktika, see Jami Forbes, “The Significance of Taliban Shari’a 
Courts in Afghanistan,” ctc Sentinel, 6, no. 5 (May 2013); Forsberg, “The Taliban’s Campaign 
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of Law Reform in a Society at War,” Asia Affairs, 40, no. 1 (March 2009): pp. 77, 87 and 
Elizabeth Lee Walker, “Culturally Attuned Governance and Justice in Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan,” International Media Ventures, 2010.
18 unama, “Mid-Year Report 2013: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2013, p. 22; unama, “Annual Report 2012: 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan, 2013, pp. 13, 25.
19 Rahmat Alizada, “Reign of the Desert Court,” Afghanistan Today, August 11, 2011.
20 Such patterns might be specific to Ghazni, where relations among Hazaras, Pashtuns, and 
Tajiks are often described as better than in the rest of the country. During the civil war, 
under Qari Baba’s rule, Ghazni City was ruled by a multiethnic coalition, which included 
the interviewee.
21 “Taliban Justice: Frustrated by Corrupt and Plodding Government Courts, Afghans Are 
Turning to Islamic Judges,” Newsweek, April 15, 2013.
According to Table 1, therefore, elders in at least five districts spread around 
the Pashtun belt agreed that Taliban courts seemed to be widely used in remote 
rural areas. Elders in various districts of Helmand as well as in the districts of 
Watapur (Kunar), Dai Chopan (Zabul), and Berg Matal (Nuristan) confirmed 
the presence of Taliban courts there. We have also additional anecdotal indica-
tions that genuine support for the Taliban courts existed in different places 
and times, coming from press reports and the interviews carried out for this 
study.17 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (unama) says 
it documented activities by Taliban courts in all regions except Bamian; Derzab 
and Qush Tepa in Jowzjan province and Watapur and Marawara in Kunar prov-
ince were mentioned explicitly.18 Shah Jahan Nuri, a member of parliament 
from Ghazni, reportedly estimated that “as much as 80 per cent of legal dis-
putes in the 14 unsecure districts of the province are resolved by the Taliban, 
who are often paid in wheat or other produce.”19 In an interview with one of 
the authors, Shah Jahan Nuri added that some Hazara people living close to 
Taliban-controlled areas in Ghazni, but not themselves under Taliban control, 
even preferred to go to the Taliban judge, who they believed did not discrimi-
nate against them.20 Newsweek reports that the Taliban may not be popular, 
but their courts are. Even a senior adviser to Afghan President Hamid Karzai 
admits that “many Afghans prefer Taliban courts to the government’s legal 
system.”21
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22 Interviews with inhabitants of Kandahar, Kunar, and Ghazni provinces, summer 2010, 
summer 2011, and autumn 2012.
23 Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser (London: Hurst, 2013), p. 113.
24 Walker, “Culturally Attuned Governance and Justice,” p. 86.
The Taliban judges seem not to take into account social status, and they 
have ruled against influential people in some interpersonal disputes. This atti-
tude facilitated the solving of many cases, especially concerning land issues.22 
Carter Malkasian who served in Helmand with the us State Department, 
observing the Taliban judges from the other side of the divide, commented 
about one of these judges in Garmser:
The people were obliged to accept his judgment. If they did not, he could 
call in fighters to enforce his decision. That said I never heard any com-
plaints about Mawlawi Mohammedullah’s judgments. I suspect people 
heeded his decision because they were fair rather than because they 
feared him.23
Similarly, a Helmand prt study found that
In areas where people have an option, the population may choose Taliban 
justice for a number of reasons, including a lack of effective alternatives, 
intimidation, expectation of receiving a favorable result, more effective 
enforcement of decisions, accessibility, and most of all swiftness.24
In the absence of a properly sampled survey, it is ultimately not possible to 
comment accurately about the attitudes toward Taliban courts among the 
population, nor is this the purpose of this article. It is clear, however, that 
Taliban courts have spread most of Afghanistan’s countryside.
The Organization of the Taliban’s Judiciary
 Quetta
In the early years of the Taliban insurgency, the judicial functions were typi-
cally administered by shadow governors, commanders, and local mullahs sym-
pathetic to the Taliban, without an organized and centralized effort to recruit 
and deploy judges. In Helmand (not the first province where large areas fell 
under Taliban influence), “Taliban” judges started appearing in 2004–2006, 
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Theo Farrell and A. Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency,” 
International Affairs, 89, no. 4 (July 2013): 845–71. At the same time, the first press reports 
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Agence France Presse, September 3, 2005.
26 Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser, pp. 112–13; Casey Garret Johnson, “Afghan Islamic 
Courts: A Pre-Taliban System With Post-2014 Potential?,” New York Times, April 17, 2013.
27 Personal communication with high-level Taliban cadre in Peshawar, March 2013.
28 Personal communication with high-level Taliban cadre in Peshawar, March 2013.
29 Bilal Sarwary, “What Happened when us Forces Left Afghan Hotspot?,” bbc News, 
December 3, 2011; Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “Taliban Courts Filling Justice Vacuum Iin 
Afghanistan,” npr, December 16 2008; Alizada, “Reign of the Desert Court”; Peter, 
“Leery of Courts”; Mary Fitzgerald, “Journey into a Land Ruled by Shadows,” The Irish 
when the Taliban had re-established some armed presence on the ground.25 
These “Taliban” judges were, in fact, local mullahs co-opted by various Taliban 
networks that were organizing semi-autonomously. In Garmser, Helmand, a 
dozen local mullahs were involved; something similar was happening in 
Panjwai, Kandahar.26 In 2003–2006, the Quetta Shura recorded 1,800 judicial 
cases processed by the Taliban governors, commanders, and local or itinerant 
mullahs in Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Nimruz, Herat, Uruzgan, and Ghazni.27
The pace of their deployment accelerated in subsequent years, with a peak 
between 2006 and 2008. The first step to establish some centralized control 
over the Taliban judiciary took place in 2007. The Quetta Taliban leadership 
created The Qaziano Komitah (Judges Committee), consisting of 20 judges 
based in Quetta to advise Taliban governors, commanders, and pro-Taliban vil-
lage judges on how to resolve cases in accordance with the Shari’a. Leading 
figures in the Komitah were a number of mawlawis (religious notable): Ahmad 
Jan Akhund, Abdul Razaq Akhund, Zalmai, Abdul Sattar, and one ‘Mohammad’. 
In its first year of existence, the committee intervened in 1,200 cases, according 
to Taliban sources. Simultaneously, the Taliban established their first real court 
in Sangin, catering to villagers in the surrounding districts of Helmand as well. 
During 2008 the Qaziano Komitah started deploying about 300 judges to the 
provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Ghazni, Nimruz, Herat, Farah, 
Uruzgan, Faryab, Wardak, and others as well, establishing for the first time 
after 2001 a Taliban-controlled judiciary.28 As generally acknowledged by 
observers, by 2008 the Taliban’s judiciary was the most noticeable aspect of 
their governance system.29 By 2011 the Taliban judiciary had therefore taken 
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Times, May 11, 2009; Jason Straziuso and Amir Shah, “As Taliban Near Kabul, Shadow Gov’t 
Takes Hold,” Associated Press, December 27, 2008; Tom Blackwell, “Taliban Runs Parallel 
Administration,” Canwest News, October 27, 2008; Steve Rennie, “Locals Live In Fear of 
Taliban ‘Shadow Government’ Gripping Parts of Kandahar,” Canadian Press, January 4, 
2009; Colin Freeze, “Taliban Religious Courts Extend Their Reach into Remote Regions,” 
Globe and Mail, June 8, 2009; Anand Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan,” New York, New 
America Foundation, 2010.
30 Interview with Taliban commander in Nad Ali, December 2011.
31 See for more details and sources on these findings of A. Giustozzi, C. Franco, and 
A. Baczko, “The Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary”, Kabul : iwa, 2012, which discusses at length
the issue of corruption within the Taliban’s judiciary.
32 An elder in Garmser was certain of the presence of local Taliban judges until 2008–2009 
(interviewed June 2012).
33 Nuristan, Jowzjan, Kunar, Wardak, Faryab, Nangarhar, Laghman, Parwan, Kapisa, Takhar, 
Badakhshan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Ghazni, Bamiyan, Samangan, Balkh, Logar, and Badghis. 
Some of these provinces, such as Logar, saw the presence of both the Peshawar and the 
Quetta Commissions.
the character of a much more organized effort, with a degree of central super-
vision, most pronounced in the part of the insurgency coordinated by the 
Peshawar shura, but also felt under the Quetta shura:
[In 2007], any commander or any judge could execute people without 
permission and without investigation, on the spot. But now they can’t do 
that. If they judge someone and want to kill him, they have to get permis-
sion from the district chief or the governor or even from Quetta. This 
change I can see.30
Although corruption and favoritism were not absent from the ranks of the 
Taliban judiciary, by and large the Taliban leadership managed to keep it under 
control through a combination of internal supervision and external oversight 
by village elders and Ulema.31 In part, this is achieved through a system of rota-
tion of the judges, enforced centrally. The Taliban therefore assigned the judges 
to areas where they did not have connections, although gaps in the judges’ 
ranks might also be filled by local judges.32
To enable recruitment from outside and rotation, the Taliban judiciary 
had to be separated from the military structure, which was inherently frag-
mented because it was based on solidarity networks (mahaz), each led by 
a charismatic  mullah and often at odds with each other. As of early 2013, 
centralization  was complete in the areas of Afghanistan subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the Peshawar Shura (see below),33 but still ongoing in those of 
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34 Herat, Farah, Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Badghis, Uruzgan, Sar-i Pul, Ghor, 
Paktika, and Logar.
35 Personal communication with Taliban high-level cadre in Peshawar, March 2013.
36 Pashto pronunciation of “phone.”
37 Personal communication with high-level Taliban cadre in Peshawar, March 2013.
38 Sarah Ladbury et al., “Helmand Justice Mapping Study,” Kabul, Cooperation for Peace and 
Unity (cpau), 2010, pp. 8–9.
39 See Giustozzi, Franco, and Baczko, “The Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary,” cit., which discusses 
at length the issue of corruption within the Taliban’s judiciary.
the Quetta Shura.34 Quetta lacked qualified judges and continued to rely on 
local mullahs in many areas; inevitably these local judges were often linked 
to the networks operating in their areas and escaped Quetta’s control. Still, 
rotations of judges occurred also between Quetta- and Peshawar-controlled 
areas.35
In 2011, however, friction within the Quetta Shura between supporters of 
two rival Taliban leaders, Mohammad Akhtar Mansur and Abdul Qayyum 
Zakir, started negatively affecting the judges, also leading to court closures. 
Their popularity began to decline in the villages, as each faction tried to dis-
credit judges affiliated with rivals. Increasingly, the Qaziano Komitah in Quetta 
started resorting again to “remote control,” with qualified judges in Quetta 
advising via satellite phone the Taliban in the provinces. The new service took 
the name of Pun36 Komitah and end users were expected to bear the cost of the 
satellite phone call.37 As Map 1 shows, most closures of Taliban courts in 2011–
2012 took place in the Quetta Shura’s core areas (Uruzgan, Helmand and 
Kandahar).
In the areas under Quetta’s influence the judges remained under the super-
vision of the shadow governors, like it had been the case everywhere until 
2008; the governor sat on top of the judges together with the so-called Civilian 
Commission (Mulki Komisiun).38 In provinces responding to Peshawar, how-
ever, it was the Military Commission that was in charge of supervising the judi-
ciary: Taliban commanders would ask villagers about the judges, while Taliban 
intelligence also observed the judges.39
 Peshawar
The Peshawar Shura was only established in 2005 and had a slow start, but by 
2009–2010 its Komitah was expanding fast. Not only did its courts became com-
mon in the east, but Ghazni became a center of judicial services run from 
Peshawar after the Quetta Shura started facing internal difficulties in 2011–2012. 
It did not just aim at the population of that province, but judges were even sent 
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40 Personal communication with high-level Taliban cadre in Peshawar, March 2013. Ghazni 
also has a strong presence of Taliban clerical networks, which create a welcoming envi-
ronment for the courts.
41 This description is based on interviews conducted for this study and on sources contacted 
within the Taliban structure in Pakistan in 2011–2012.
42 Personal communication with high-level Taliban cadre in Peshawar, March 2013.
43 Elder in Musa Qala, March 2012.
44 Personal communication with high-level Taliban cadre in Peshawar, March 2013.
toward the south. With 80 judges, Ghazni had probably the highest density of 
Taliban courts in Afghanistan.40
In areas under the Peshawar Shura, a specialized “Executive Council” was 
subordinated to the Provincial Military Commission. Staffed with religious 
scholars, the Council supervised the work of the judges; based on its recom-
mendations, the Provincial Military Commission could throw out a sentence. 
It should be noted that while ordinary judges had power over Taliban com-
manders and fighters, they did not have power over the Military Commission 
and its members, who were directly supervised by the leadership in Pakistan.41
This increasingly centralized system was run in collaboration with local 
Taliban authorities and leaders. In early 2013 the Taliban claimed that the 
Peshawar-run judges’ committee alone had 566 judges in 18 provinces and the 
Quetta-run committee had 324 in 11 provinces.42 Map 1 shows the geographic 
expansion of the Taliban courts. In some areas, however, the Taliban courts 
may invite people to neighboring districts because the Taliban judges felt safer 
there.43
By 2012 the judiciary had probably become the second- or third-largest item 
in the Taliban’s budget after military operations, with a total of $60 million 
allocated, of which $25 million went to the Peshawar-run committee and $35 
million to the Quetta one.44 The Taliban were ready to pay relatively good sala-
ries for their judges, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Monthly Salary of Taliban Judges, in Pakistani Rupees
Provincial District
Stera Mahkama (higher court) 50,000 30,000
Ijra’iya Mahkama (“executive” court) 40,000 20,000
Ibtedai’ya Mahkama (low court) 35,000 15,000
Source: Taliban cadre in Peshawar, March 2013.
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46 Interview with Taliban commanders from Nad Ali, March 2012.
47 Communication with senior Taliban commander, Pakistan, February 2012.
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presence of a similarly composed commission in some cases (interview with an elder of 
Andar, summer 2012).
49 Elder in Zhari, summer 2011. A similar view was expressed by an elder in Panjwai, summer 2011.
The September 2011 Reform in Peshawar
Until 2011, the top judicial institution of the Taliban was the same as it had 
been in the 1990s: the Markazi Mahkama (Central Court), the ultimate instance 
of appeal, in practice permanently based in Pakistan. By 2011 it had, in fact, 
three branches, under the Quetta judicial commission, under the Miranshah 
Shura (Waziristan) and under the Peshawar Shura.45 This system was obvi-
ously unpractical in terms of handling appeals, as appellants would need to 
travel to Pakistan.
From the early post-2001 years the Taliban had been aware of the fact that 
handling appeals needed a multi-layered judiciary on the ground. A Taliban 
source stated that the Taliban had initially planned to set up a higher court 
(Stera Mahkama), an “executive” court (Ijra’iya Mahkama) at the provincial 
level, and a lower court (Ibteda’iya Mahkama) at the district level. After some 
early experiments, implementation proved difficult because of the war, 
although in some areas the Taliban claimed to have set up the system as 
planned. In Helmand, for example, attempts to implement the three-layered 
system were abandoned around 2006.46 In most provinces, until September 
2011, only Ibteda’iya (lower) courts existed with a varying number of judges but 
no capacity to handle appeals through the courts. In some areas, an Ijra’iya 
Mahkama (“executive” court) was set up at the provincial level.47
As most provinces under the Peshawar Shura leadership lacked higher 
courts, appeals were handled through the Provincial Military Commission 
jointly with the Executive Council. The latter also organized coordination 
meetings and handled complaints, often on a weekly basis.48 The elders, how-
ever, unanimously said that few villagers risked taking appeals to the 
Commission. The process appeared quite intimidating to them, as the leading 
Taliban commanders of the province were in attendance:
Most of the people are afraid of the Taliban and they cannot tell the 
Taliban judges that their judgment was not fair and just. But some people 
who have good relations with Taliban commanders in the area are able to 
say sometimes that their judgment was not fair and that they do not 
agree with the court.49
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Elders or villagers linked to the Taliban might influence the court in their favor, 
contacting their direct proxies within the movement. This process usually fol-
lowed tribal fault lines or was based on existing patronage relationships 
between pure Taliban affiliates and their “political” support network.50
The Peshawar Judicial Commission, in charge of all judicial activities, was 
led in early 2013 by Mawlawi Atiqullah, a full member of the Peshawar Shura, 
and had five more members, at least one of which was a Pakistani. Four of the 
members were fully qualified religious judges (Qazi). The Commission oper-
ated an office headed by Mawlawi Zalmai, who coordinated the appointment 
of the judges in the provinces.51
In September 2011 the Peshawar Judicial Commission started implementing 
a general overhaul of their system, trying to re-establish the three-layered judi-
ciary of the Emirate’s time and to separate the judiciary from the military, in 
order to avoid abuses and intimidation and to facilitate appeals. Under the 
new system, executions had to be authorized in Peshawar. Ibtedai’ya (lower), 
Ijra’iya (executive), and Stera (higher) courts were supposed to be gradually 
established in each district, while at the provincial level another three layers of 
courts would deal with the cases that the district courts were not able to 
resolve. By 2013 the Taliban were claiming to have implemented the system in 
all areas under the Peshawar Shura. The provincial-level judges were the best 
qualified, hence their appeal role, replacing that of the Taliban Central Court 
in Garmser (moved from Nawzad, but de facto based in Pakistan). Lower courts 
would deal with disputes and petty criminal cases, higher courts with appeals 
on the lower court cases and with all serious criminal offenses, while the 
appeal court would deal with appeals from the higher courts and act as a 
Taliban military court. Provincial lower courts would take cases not resolved 
by district appeal courts and run them to the appropriate court level (petty 
criminal cases to lower court, etc.). Data obtained from the Peshawar Judicial 
Commission suggests that the Taliban see the new system as more effective in 
terms of handling appeals: according to these sources, between September 
2011 and September 2012 there were 3,200 low court cases and 1,318 executive 
court cases, of which a number were appeal cases from the low courts. The 
higher court reportedly received 314 cases, which, if true, would point to an 
increase in the number of appeals compared to the negligible level of previous 
years. The Taliban also reported an increase in the overall number of cases, up 
81% from the average of the previous three years, although this could also 
likely be due to the expansion of the Peshawar Shura. This increase occurred 
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despite a newly introduced 2,000 Afghani (about $40) fee for each case.52 It is 
impossible to confirm these figures, and the system was implemented while 
the interviews for this project were ongoing. Meanwhile, some limited evi-
dence has begun appearing in the press, like an appeal case in Paktia, referred 
to a Taliban “upper court” based in Pakistan.53
Each court was supposed to be staffed by one judge and two assistants, usu-
ally local clerics, who would carry out preliminary investigations of cases and 
resolve them, if possible. Higher and appeal court judges could also operate as 
lower court judges if required by the workload. At the same time, fixed courts 
were re-established in many districts and it became possible again to file cases 
without having to go through the Taliban commanders. The Executive Council 
inside the Military Commission was abolished, as appeals could now be han-
dled by the Stera Mahkama (higher courts), established at the provincial level; 
the function of vetting and controlling judges was safeguarded by having the 
three judges’ view and counter-sign every sentences. The provincial Stera 
Mahkama (higher court) judge also assumed the role of De Adalye Qaziyun 
Meshr (head of the judges), providing supervision of the judges in the prov-
ince. As of March 2013, this reform only applied to the Peshawar-based judicial 
system, where interviews showed that it had been applied at the end of 2011 in 
Laghman already, and not to the Quetta-based one.54
From Deadlock to Reform in Quetta
The 2011–2012 crisis within the Quetta Shura leadership derailed the develop-
ment of the judiciary in the south, at least temporarily. Sources in Peshawar 
indicate that while some younger leaders like Abdul Qayyum Zakir were in 
favor of Peshawar-style centralization, the old political leadership did not see 
the point of investing the required human and financial resources. The Quetta 
Judicial Commission could project less authority due to the strength of the 
southern networks, the lack of will with the Taliban leadership to bring the 
networks out of individual control, and its weaker financial means. It was also 
affected by the rivalry between the Akhtar Mansur faction and the Abdul 
Qayyum Zakir faction. The two rivals started competing for the allegiance of 
the networks, increasing the latter’s autonomy. The Quetta Judicial Commission 
was staffed as of early 2013 by six mawlawis, of which three were aligned with 
the Akhtar Mansur faction (Zalmai Durrani, head; Zalman Hotak; Ahmad Jan 
 215The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary, 2003–2013
central asian affairs 1 (2014) 199-224
<UN>
55 Personal communication with high-level Taliban cadre in Peshawar, March 2013.
56 Communication with Taliban cadre in Quetta, December 2013.
57 This was at least the case in Kandahar and in Kunar, according to our interviewees there.
58 Taliban judge in Faryab, summer 2011
59 Interview with Taliban commander in Sayed Abad, autumn 2011.
60 Elder from village in Dawlatabad, summer 2011.
Akhundzada) and three with the Zakir faction (Abdul Rauf, Abdul Salim, and 
Bashir Ahmad).55 In 2013, however, the impasse was resolved, and the Quetta 
Judicial Commission sent judges back into Afghanistan and adopted a reform 
along the lines of the Peshawar Judicial Commission: three layers of courts, 
enabling appeals on a significant scale for the first time.56
Coercion and Legitimization
Taliban Justice Against State Justice
The Taliban have been using their judiciary as an instrument of domination in 
competition with the government. They banned people from attending the 
government courts and channeled them to their own courts. Elders and Taliban 
largely concurred in the interviews that the Taliban had a standing policy of 
punishing severely, sometimes with death, those who took cases already 
judged by them to government courts, even if nobody could cite actual cases of 
such sanctions being implemented. Though none of them were prompted on 
this specific issue—they were asked if people were going to government 
courts—four out of five elders in Kandahar, two out of six in Sayed Abad, and 
three out of four in Dai Chopan explicitly asserted it. In this way the Taliban 
ensure that no alternative to their rule persists.
The Taliban courts actively sought cases to deal with and did not wait for 
villagers to report cases, particularly in areas where the intake of trials was 
modest. Taliban judges might even suddenly turn up in a village asking about a 
particular dispute or a criminal case, presumably following a report by the 
Taliban’s own intelligence system.57 This suggests that the Taliban did not 
merely conceive the judiciary as a service being provided, but as a strategy to 
penetrate rural communities. Resistance to the verdict of Taliban judges was 
rare and generally dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly.58 One Taliban commander 
in Sayed Abad could only remember a single case, seven months earlier, of a 
family who rejected a Taliban sentence and “insulted” the judges. The family 
head was arrested and executed within hours.59 As an elder put it, those who 
lost Taliban trials were afraid of complaining.60
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In asserting their claim to a monopoly over justice, the Taliban showed little 
interest for the subtleties of the rule of law. Until late 2011, higher courts and 
the Central Court played a marginal role as, in general, appeal rights were theo-
retical; the Taliban tended to perceive appeals as a disguised challenge to the 
legitimacy of their rulings.
Coercion inevitably created resentment. One interviewee for this project 
was involved as an elder in Taliban trials, but nonetheless criticized the coer-
cive approach of the Taliban:
The Taliban do not care about the quality of the services that they pro-
vide to people, whether it is good or bad. The only thing that is important 
for the Taliban is that people believe that the Taliban have a system and 
judges, and that no villager is allowed to go to the Afghan government 
court. In other words, the Taliban do not care whether the judges they 
assigned to a village works impartially according to Islamic Shari’a or not, 
they just want to terrify people.61
The findings of Walker’s survey seem confirmed:
Many Helmandis recognize that the Taliban violate Afghan law by seek-
ing little corroboration or verification of facts before issuing a judgment 
and punishment, without any chance of an appeal. Unlike the formal 
court system, the Taliban lack any sufficient investigative infrastructure 
and information on which to make fair and informed decisions, resulting 
in mistakes and miscarriages of justice.62
Another potential weakness of the was the precariousness or uncertainty over 
the future of Taliban rule in specific areas:
There are some people who are not happy with Taliban judgments, 
because they think that the judgment of Taliban doesn’t have a high 
authority, as they are not an official government. If tomorrow they 
leave the district, all their judgments and their court become nothing, 
because all these decision and judgments will have no power and will 
not stand.63
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Such weakness appeared to have been compounded by the transition to mobile 
courts in 2010–2012. The shift conveyed a sense of the Taliban being on the run 
within the population, particularly where the Taliban had difficulties in mov-
ing freely around or could not stay too long in a village.64 The Taliban recog-
nized the counter-productive character of the extremely quick justice delivered 
by the mobile courts.65 During the second half of 2012, the Taliban re-estab-
lished fixed courts in areas evacuated by isaf troops.
Despite the resentment created by coercion and the precariousness dis-
cussed above, once a sentence was issued, the beneficiaries had a vested inter-
est in siding with the Taliban. Resolving cases created a relationship of 
dependence between a portion of the population and the authority that 
administered justice—the Taliban, in this case. For example, in one land dis-
pute in Sayedabad, a Taliban court rejected a claim to a piece of land, but the 
landlord was aware that he would be exposed to a new claim if the local bal-
ance of strength was to change:
The Taliban judge announced the result of the court in my favour and he 
told XXX not to disturb me, otherwise he would punish him strongly. 
I know that as long as the Taliban are active in this district, XXX can’t 
do anything, but if the Taliban leave this place, he will cause me 
problems.66
Taliban Law and Order
Although some elders criticized the summary character of Taliban justice and 
particularly the rapidity of the trials, the level of interpersonal conflict appears 
to have reached such a level in many areas of Afghanistan that people appeared 
more eager for efficient conflict resolution than thorough judiciary decision-
making.67 As long as the source of judgment was seen as impartial and not 
corrupt, a quick decision would be favored over long deliberations to prevent 
the further escalation of the conflicts. The preoccupation was thus not so 
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much to win the case, but rather to terminate the dispute with a durable and 
honorable settlement. One case reported in the press highlighted these 
concerns: the loser in the trial accepted the ruling, because the Taliban 
judges argued in terms of Shari’a, which he couldn’t reject, and because “the 
key thing was that the dispute was ended. I have to live and work here. I choose 
what works.”68
In another example, in the village of Marid, Ghaziabad district, an inhabit-
ant reported a dispute over a forest, which had paralyzed the village for years. 
Insecurity was constant between the two families involved, and the tension 
between the two communities was very high. The disputants went to the 
Asadabad court, but the judge’s decision was ignored by the losing party. They 
sought the arbitration of Malek Zarin, who was at that time one of the most 
powerful strongmen in higher Kunar, but again the losers would not submit. 
The Taliban judge, called in as a last resort, imposed his sentence. He managed 
to resolve the case because he entered the village with tens of fighters and 
threatened to burn both houses if the contestants would not abide by his sen-
tence. The person who recounted the story was politically inclined against the 
Taliban, but he noted the satisfaction of the inhabitants as it had put an end to 
the cycle of violence.69 In yet another case reported in the press, a villager who 
had lost the trial stated that he was happy with the resolution brought by the 
Taliban court.70
The ability to implement sentences, a by-product of the ability to coerce, is 
a central issue in this regard. Almost all the elders interviewed for the project 
emphasized the weakness of the Afghan government, its inability to imple-
ment judicial decisions, and the lack of alternatives apart from the Taliban; 
while not necessarily expressing support for the Taliban, they seemed resigned 
to accept the new status quo. One farmer in Ghaziabad district described the 
coercive power of the Taliban with a degree of respect, implying that a weak 
government does not deserve the villagers’ esteem: “The difference between 
the government and the Taliban is that when the Taliban pronounce a verdict, 
they implement their decision. When they say something, they do it.”
Though many rural communities might trust customary justice more than 
the Taliban system, only the latter could enforce the verdicts. In Kunar the vil-
lagers contacted for this study seemed impressed by the Taliban because they 
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stressed implementation, punishing those disrespecting the rulings.71 It was 
not uncommon to hear interviewees accept the need for a strong element of 
coercion in the running of the justice system. As a villager in Sayed Abad told 
the interviewer in autumn 2011:
I am a member of society; if my community is happy with the Taliban 
court, I should also be happy with it. It doesn’t make sense that I agree 
with and support the Taliban judges only when a Taliban court rules in 
my favor, while when I lose in the court, I disapprove of the system or 
disagree with the judges’ decisions.
The importance of this factor seems to be confirmed by the finding of a 2010 
survey: rates of acceptance for the Taliban’s courts in “bad security areas” were 
higher than in areas with good security.72 By presenting themselves through 
their courts as the “law and order” movement, the Taliban were hoping to find 
a constituency. The fact that Taliban commanders often cast an image of gratu-
itous ruthlessness and of weak discipline does not go against this argument: it 
is exactly because fighting a guerrilla war is not a “law and order” business that 
the Taliban use their judiciary to redress the balance in terms of image.
Another aspect of domination, with the help of a judiciary system that pro-
duces legitimacy, is predictability and neutrality.73 A judicial system needs to 
make sure that the verdicts are consistent and impartial and that those who 
lost a trial can hope to win another in the future. The claim to judge according 
to a widely accepted legal code, the Shari’a, strengthens their legitimacy in a 
deeply religious population, particularly when the codes of law used by the 
Kabul government are little known, misunderstood, and sometimes resented.74
The reliance on the Shari’a brought a degree of legitimacy even among peo-
ple who did not like the Taliban much or those who lose a case. There was a 
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general agreement among the court users interviewed that challenging a judg-
ment generally recognized by elders and mullahs as based on Shari’a was 
unthinkable, even in the absence of coercion.75
The use by the Taliban of the Emirate’s logo, official letters, and a procedural 
and standardized process was also meant to further legitimize the coercion 
and convey an image of institutionalized authority, whose behavior is predict-
able, constrained by rules, and not simply one of pure force. We can therefore 
speak in this case of “coercive legitimization”: coercion has a legitimizing 
impact, especially as the alternative is perceived to be chaos and anarchy.
Coercion can produce legitimization under certain conditions. However, it 
is an expensive practice and inevitably unmanageable in the long term. Some 
level of cooperation has to be secured for stability, leading to what political 
scientists commonly call a “legitimate authority.”76 Sources within the Taliban 
judiciary expressed great confidence in the quality of the service they provide 
to the community. Virtually every judge and commander interviewed was con-
vinced that gradually the people would be drawn over to their side. This indi-
cates that the Taliban thought of their judiciary as more than a mere instrument 
of domination.
Symbolic Violence
The Taliban courts are generally perceived as harsh and rigid. Executions are 
implemented in an exemplary manner to convey a message of severity and 
moral order to the people. The Taliban tend to advertise them, and they usually 
are reported in the Afghan press. Whatever the reasons for a judge to go for the 
harshest prescribed punishment in a particular case, the Taliban present the 
verdict as a warning to potential transgressors. For example, when a pregnant 
woman was executed for adultery in Badghis in 2010, the Taliban spokesman 
stated: “We gave this decision so that in future no-one should have these illegal 
affairs. We whipped her in front of all the local people, to show them an exam-
ple. Then we shot her.”77
Despite advertising the most extreme forms of punishment from the Shari’a 
code, the Taliban judges themselves rarely implemented them in civil cases. 
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In the early years of Taliban courts in Helmand, harsh punishments appear to 
have been common and
Despite this broad tolerance for harsh punishments, the Taliban’s punish-
ments based on their interpretation of the Quran (also known as hud-
dud), particularly executions and floggings, have gone beyond what many 
Helmandis consider acceptable under their local views or traditions.78
In general, however, this does not seem to have been the rule. In 2012 unama 
counted 33 executions by the Taliban judiciary.79 The Peshawar Qaziano 
Komitah reported having sentenced through its courts 220 individuals to death 
in 2012; 32 amputations were also ordered, out of a total of 5,030 cases being 
processed. The Quetta Qaziano Komitah reportedly issued 120 death sentences 
in 2012, out of 3,289 cases.80 Yet most executions probably concerned mostly 
“political” cases (such as spying) and few civil cases, in which the recourse to 
extreme punishments was overall not common. This might have less to do with 
Taliban leniency than a desire to avoid creating bitterness against them. Thus 
inter-party agreements, blood money, or questioning meant to allow the 
accused to avoid sentencing were routinely used in adultery cases, for exam-
ple, to avoid the harshest punishments. Although the Taliban rely on a rule of 
law system advertised as draconian for its deterrent effect against crime, they 
adjust to local situations and accept informal searches for solutions—as 
allowed in fact by the Shari’a.81
Co-optation of Elders
In addition, the Taliban have been to some extent co-opting customary justice 
as part of their effort to legitimize their own judiciary. Concerning the attitude 
of Taliban judges toward Pashtunwali, the customary norms, there seemed to 
be strongly varying opinions among them. When asked if they recognized and 
allowed customary norms, 19 out of 23 Taliban judges answered that only 
Shari’a was allowable, and four said that codes like Pashtunwali could play a 
complementary role, claiming it was in full accordance to Shari’a.82
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The judges who ruled out the role of customary codes in their courts insisted 
that anybody who wanted a case to be decided according to Pashtunwali would 
not go to a Taliban court in the first place. They also stated that the leadership 
(“Mullah Omar”) had explicitly ordered judges not to follow customs and tradi-
tions.83 In practice, however, Taliban courts and customary justice turn out to 
be often complementary. While in some areas at certain points they might 
have banned elders from administering justice,84 in most other cases Taliban 
judges and commanders said that the movement has encouraged villagers to 
take small disputes—disputes that do not entail the risk of involving external 
power-holders or a recourse to violence—to their elders and to resolve them 
there.85 Elders confirmed that they were dealing with disputes alongside the 
Taliban, if not under their control. Villagers would usually first bring a dispute 
to the attention of the elders and, only if the elders failed to resolve it, would 
they contact the Taliban.86
More importantly, the Taliban judges often co-opt the elders into their trials, 
allowing them to represent the parties and to negotiate a settlement.87
In practice, the system adopted by the Taliban has made the functioning of 
customary justice increasingly dependent on the Taliban’s support, without 
which communities would often not be able to enforce decisions. When the 
judges arbitrate a dispute, they rely as much as possible on the local commu-
nity to implement their verdict in the name of the Taliban. If they fail to do so, 
a Taliban commander would ensure that the judge’s decision is enforced. 
Armed Taliban fighters will also ensure that the sentence is implemented in 
cases involving more drastic punishments, such as murder, adultery, or 
theft.88 The fact that there is considerable overlap between Shari’a and 
Pashtunwali allows space for the elders to play a role in Taliban trials and to 
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thesis on roving versus stationary bandits, see Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, 
and Development,” American Political Science Review, 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–76.
mediate disputes. There seems to be clear limits however to how much cus-
tomary justice is allowed to play a role in Taliban courts; for example in Logar 
and Ghazni it was found that baad (the practice of giving girls as blood money) 
was completely rejected by Taliban judges, even if the Taliban did not interfere 
in practice when elders and tribal shuras decided autonomously about it.89
 Conclusion
At the time of this research, the Taliban’s judicial system was an instrument of 
population control, which relied to a large extent on coercion. Some aspects 
of this coercive effort were more controversial than others. The Taliban’s deal-
ing with common criminality and resolving disputes was often welcome, 
though the weak appeal system and the rapidity of the trials was sometimes 
criticized. The summary character of the judiciary was perceived as much 
more problematic in relation to accusations of spying and collaboration with 
the government.
The Taliban seemed aware that various types of coercion have different 
impacts. Roaming bands of fighters who simply impose their will on the popu-
lation are dependent on local military superiority. A more structured approach 
to coercion, featuring rules, regulation and supervision over the military, allows 
less use of violence and promises increased predictability for the population, 
making active resistance less of a necessity.90 In the long run, the establish-
ment of credible judiciary institutions reshapes the social environment and 
creates vested interests in favor of Taliban domination.
The Taliban have invested considerable energy and human resources to 
integrate their coercion over civilians within a judiciary framework. They have 
faced a number of constraints and problems, ranging from the scarcity of edu-
cated cadres to the military pressure over them. The continuous investment in 
the courts by the Taliban leadership in such a context confirms that their focus 
on the judiciary was part of a determined political strategy.
The Taliban seem to have realized that they needed to separate their judi-
ciary from the military if they wanted it to be credible. In the areas controlled 
by the Peshawar shura at least, the field military structure remained in charge 
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of supervising the judiciary until late 2011, showing the ambiguities of the 
requirements of their organizational model: strengthening the position of the 
judges while retaining control of the judiciary for political ends. Eventually, 
however, the judiciary and the military were separated.
Finally, the Taliban tried to establish a more cooperative governance frame-
work through the delivery of justice. While the Taliban advertised the toughest 
punishments of the Shari’a, in practice they typically used all the facilities 
available within it for achieving negotiated settlements.
The Taliban judiciary system appears rather sophisticated, given that it 
operates within a context of war. It is part of the Taliban strategy to “hook” 
the communities up and create locally a vested interest in their presence. 
Once a case was decided in favor of somebody, he would have something to 
lose if the Taliban were pushed back and government jurisdiction were to be 
re-established, while the community as a whole would fear the reopening of 
the conflict.
